PEDRO: Secure Pedestrian Mobility Verification in V2P Communication using Commercial Off-the-shelf Mobile Devices


Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P) communication enables numerous safety benefits such as real-time collision detection and alert, but poses new security challenges. An imminent and probable scenario is where a malicious node claiming to be a legitimate pedestrian within the network broadcasts false observations or phenomena on the roads (e.g., traffic load, road hazard, and false road crossing alarms) in order to impede traffic flow, erode user’s trust in alert messages, or even cause traffic accidents. Therefore, it is crucial to identify legitimate road users against adversaries pretending to be one. In this work, we propose PEDRO, a PEDestRian mObility verification mechanism for pedestrians using commodity hardware, where only legitimate mobile pedestrians can be admitted to the ad hoc network consisting of trustworthy vehicles and pedestrians. We leverage the round-trip time (RTT) of wireless signal between vehicle and pedestrian’s devices, and verify only moving (mobile) ones while rejecting stationary ones, based on the realistic assumption that the adversaries are likely to remotely launch attacks through static malicious devices. Through an extensive analysis based on simulation as well as real-world experiments, we show that PEDRO’s verification takes under 8s while achieving an 8.5% Equal Error Rate (EER) under regular road environments.

Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on CPS&IoT Security and Privacy